It is only the crudest and most obvious form of power that comes, in
Mao's phrase, from the barrel of a gun. A deeper and more lasting
form of power comes from influencing the perceptions of others about
'what is', 'what should be,' and 'what is possible' so that they
voluntarily take actions that serve your deepest interests. In other
words, power comes from control over a people's culture.
It is not surprising, therefore, that culture is political. Neither is it
surprising that there is frequent struggle for control over the
technologies that are used to create, transmit, and incorporate culture
into daily life.
Telecommunications is one of those technologies.
Telecommunications is not a product or market like most others. No
matter how essential to survival, most products are simply objects.
We use them and put them away. Despite the claims of modern
advertising, clothes (or cars or toothpaste, etc.) do not make the man.
Neither are we are what we eat. But telecommunications is about
ideas and ideals. It shapes our understanding and desires.
RISE AND FALL OF NWICO
During the 1970s, the growth of transnational corporations and
international telecommunications led to the increasing influence on
the world's media by Western (mostly US) businesses, the
predominance of Western cultural products and news perspectives,
and a growing commercialization of both the economics and
messages of mass media. The governments of many developing
nations saw this globalization as a threat to their political, economic,
and cultural sovereignty. Government representatives in the Non
Aligned Movement and UNESCO drafted statements calling for a New
World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The main
thrust was a call for greater 'freedom of opinion, expression and
information' and that 'access by the public to information should be
guaranteed by the diversity of the sources and means of information
available to it, thus enabling each individual to check the accuracy of
facts and to appraise events objectively.' It also stated that it was
'necessary to correct the inequalities in the flow of information to and
from developing countries.'
In 1980, Nobel (and Lenin!) Peace Prize winner, Sean McBride
assembled a group that issued what was called the McBride Report .
It, too, criticized the growing commercialization of the media and its
increasing control by powerful elites. But McBride also emphasized
that governments of developing countries needed to take an active
role in developing an internal communications infrastructure. At the
same time, the Report urged that national communications policies
should be developed through a process of 'broad public participation'
aimed at increasing local empowerment and enhancing democratic
rights. McBride also understood that success would require
technology advance and he specifically encouraged the use of low
powered radio as a counter to imported mass media.
The call for a NWICO was supported by an awkward coalition of
NonAligned governments, independent activists, and the Soviet bloc
which correctly saw it's critique of Western-based transnational
corporations as an attempt to reduce US influence around the world.
In fact, many Third World governments did exercise monopoly
control over their national communication systems. They justified
this by the poverty of their countries, which made government one of
the few entities with the capital needed to create national systems,
and by the vital role of communications in the difficult task of
creating unified nations out of the ruins of colonialism. Furthermore,
state ownership of telecommunications often provided a desperately
needed source of revenue. On the other hand, many governments
used their monopoly status as a lever for corruption and patronage.
Worse, state controlled media were often little more than propaganda
arms of the ruling elite in its effort to protect its privileges and
prevent democratic upsurge. In these situations, privatization of the
media was legitimately seen as a strategy for diversity of perspectives,
more engaging content, and democratic influence.
Still, the US outrage was highly hypocritical. Behind the liberal
rhetoric was the reality that it's basic thrust was to move control of
the developing world's media from local elites to transnational boards
of directors, while opening the floodgates to Western content and
programming. Nonetheless, the US attack intimidated the UN. By the
end of the 1980s, the UN withdrew all official support for the NWICO
which seemed to be buried (along with the Soviet Bloc and the
NonAligned Movement) by the US-led, post-Cold War, 'New
World Order' that the Persian Gulf War was supposed to have
inaugurated in 1990.
BIRTH OF THE PCC
Now operating on their own, democratic activists and progressive
media professionals began to slowly regroup. Several additional
McBride Roundtables were held and issued statements. The World
Association for Christian Communication (WACC) organized several
gatherings in southern nations which also issued statements. A
document, called The People's Communication Charter (PCC), was
developed by the Centre for Communication and Human Rights (The
Netherlands), the Third World Network (Malaysia), and the AMARC
World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (Peru/Canada).
In March of 1996 an international gathering in St. Louis, Missouri,
founded the Cultural Environment Movement (CEM) and adopted the
PCC as its platform.
The PCC has subsequently been endorsed by several dozen additional
organizations in the USA and abroad. The preamble to the PCC reads:
This bottom-up strategy frees the PCC movement from much of the
stifling language and protocol of ministerial diplomacy, and allows it
to evolve through interaction with other democratic movements.
More important, it creates the space to critique domestic as well as
international media systems.
Second, PCC supporters are aware of the need for government action
to create a telecommunications infrastructure, governance procedures,
and usage opportunities capable of supporting democratic activities
at both national and community levels. However, the PCC remains
agnostic on the forms of ownership, investment, and control over the
international and national communications systems that might be
appropriate to meet the particular circumstances of each region,
nation, or community. By implication, the PCC holds that neither
state ownership nor transnational domination are optimal, stating
that 'all people have the right of access to communication channels
independent of governmental or commercial control.' Despite the
absence of a specific method of institutionalizing this independence
(e.g. through a dedicated revenue flow, democratic governance
system, and accessible method of operation) this general call for civic
bandwidth is central to the PCC's positive vision. Some PCC
supporters stress the importance of new or 'alternative' media
channels, perhaps owned by nonprofit, locally controlled
organizations. Other PCC supporters focus on reforming the existing
mass media organizations.
Instead of prescribing solutions, the 18 Articles of the PCC focus on
the 'human needs and rights' that a communications system should
serve. It states that the system should treat people with dignity,
provide democratic access to information and communication,
respect cultural differences, meet children's needs, protect privacy, be
accountable, and more.
Third, rather than mandate the desired media content, the PCC seeks
to 'popularize' access to, participation in, and accountability of all
forms of Information and Communication Technologies and
Media/Cultural systems. This primarily means vastly expanding the
number of people who are involved with policy-making and
production. Achieving this would not necessarily determine the kinds
of cultural content that the system would carry. It merely creates a
structure that is under neither state nor commercial control. However,
the process of fighting for such a goal would immediately bring the
campaign into conflict with the political and/or business elites who
now control media (as well as with many of the professional groups
who, no matter how civic-minded they feel they are, get their status
and power from their 'insider' role in the media industry). In many
situations (but not all), this will impart a progressive tone to the
campaign which may impact the kinds of allies and enemies that it
attracts as well as its ultimate effect on media content.
Fourth, PCC leaders understand that, in the words of Katha Pollitt,
'movements need media, but media don't make a movement' (The
Nation, 11/10/97). Most people do not see media reform as an issue
in itself.
Media is usually seen instrumentally, as something that has positive
or negative impact on a group's ability to accomplish its primary
goals. Therefore, building a coalition big enough to successfully
demand media reform is partly dependent upon working with other
movements to help them think through the media access implications
of their own campaigns.
THE DISCUSSION CONTINUES
While cloaked in the language of universal rights (which leads some
post-structural critics to complain about its pretension) the PCC is
essentially a call for additional discussion and action rather than a
definitive text. One such event took place at the 'Democratizing
Global Communications' conference sponsored by the Havens Center
at the University of Wisconsin, Madison in September, 1997 which
brought together representatives of several PCC-endorsing
organizations along with people from the Media and Democracy
Conference, the McBride Roundtable, FAIR, and others. In addition to
making suggestions for future revisions of the PCC text, the PCC
principals were summarized and extended into five points:
1) No public or private power, domestic or international, should be
allowed to dominate the information or communication systems of
any state, nation, community, or social group.
This includes the right to own, produce, and benefit from cultural
expression.
A CPSR ROLE?
A.J. Liebling's quip that 'freedom of the press is guaranteed only to
those who own one' contains both obvious and hidden truths.
Obviously, people's ability to exercise free speech is shaped by their
place within society's hierarchy of wealth and power. The more
wealth and power you have, the more you can turn your constitutional
right of free speech into actual public communication.
But hidden in the quip is the fact that public communication requires
a 'press' - some technological method of production and distribution.
Every method of communication, from old hand-fed printing presses
to today's digital satellites, has inherent characteristics that
fundamentally influence it's potential use. It is the interaction of
power and technology that shapes the ways communication systems
are actually developed, the uses to which they are put, and the people
who are able to use them.
The digital and data-based telecommunication systems with which
CPSR primarily concerns itself are an increasingly important part of
our national, and global, information and communication
infrastructure. This system, too, is experiencing rapid
commercialization and concentration. At the same time, its origins in
the free-exchange-of-information world of scientific and academic
research has led to functional capabilities that give it a unique
potential for democratic discourse.
CPSR's focus on Internet governance sets an appropriate course for the
organization's efforts in coming months. But we need to remember
that we are dealing with a limited corner of the world communication
system. The people and groups that have adopted the PCC do not
claim that it is a perfect document. Critiques and suggestions for
changes are being collected by the CEM. But it is a beginning point, a
way for groups to rally around a common set of demands, a unifying
language and perspective. Reading, discussing, perhaps endorsing,
and taking action based on the PCC would be a worthwhile extension
of CPSR's work.
THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNICATION CHARTER: Democratizing
Communications Against Both Corporate and State Dominance
by Steven E. Miller
In the US, with the Cold War still raging, and with conservatives
increasingly pushing to ignore multi-national forums (such as the UN
and UNESCO) in favor of US-dominated bilateral agreements, the US
attacked NWICO as a threat to freedom. Equating freedom with the
private pursuit of profit in an open market, the US stated that
government ownership of media would lead to 'censorship and
control of information flow.' It threatened to, and then did,
withdraw from UNESCO in protest.
- Communication is basic to the life of all individuals and their
communities.
- All people are entitled to participate in communication, and in
making decisions about communication within and between
societies.
- The majority of the world's peoples lack minimal technological
resources for survival and communication. Over half of them
have not yet made a single telephone call.
- Commercialization of media and concentration of media
ownership erode the public sphere and fail to provide for
cultural and information needs, including the plurality of
opinions and the diversity of cultural expressions and languages
necessary for democracy.
- Massive and pervasive media violence polarized societies,
exacerbates conflicts, and cultivates fear and mistrust, making
people vulnerable and dependent.
- Stereotypical portrayals misrepresent all of us and stigmatize
those who are the most vulnerable.
Learning from the failure of the NWICO campaign, the PCC seeks to
incorporate the key lessons and move forward. First, its backers
recognize the eventual necessity of negotiations among 'official'
(and therefore often bureaucratic) Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) followed by inter-governmental meetings and ministerial
agreements. But, like the campaign against land mines, PCC
supporters first seek to build support through international networks
of grass roots organizations and coalitions.
2) Methods of implementing human rights of information, expression,
and communication can not be treated as a trade barrier under
international law or treaty such as the World Trade Organization.
3) Peoples everywhere have a human right to expect that their
information and media systems promote a democratic public-opinion
formation process; to further this aim:
a) commercial speech can be treated differently than political, civic
and cultural speech in law, regulation, and policy.
b) people have a right to 'fair use' of privately 'owned' intellectual
property.
4) People have a human right to expect that their media, information,
and communication systems serve educational needs, especially of
children.
5) People have a human right to expect their media, information, and
communication systems to serve the needs of cultural self
determination.